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Abstract Emotions and their psychophysiological corre-
lates are thought to play an important role in decision-
making under risk. We used a novel gambling task to
measure psychophysiological responses during selection of
explicitly presented risky options and feedback processing.
Active-choice trials, in which the participant had to select
the size of bet, were compared to fixed-bet, no-choice trials.
We further tested how the chances of winning and bet size
affected choice behavior and psychophysiological arousal.
Individual differences in impulsive and risk-taking traits
were assessed. The behavioral results showed sensitivity to
the choice requirement and to the chances of winning:
Participants were faster to make a response on no-choice
trials and when the chances of winning were high. In
active-choice trials, electrodermal activity (EDA) increased
with bet size during both selection and processing of losses.
Cardiac responses were sensitive to choice uncertainty:
Stronger selection-related heart rate (HR) decelerations
were observed in trials with lower chances of winning,
particularly on active-choice trials. Finally, betting behavior
and psychophysiological responsiveness were moderately
correlated with self-reported impulsivity-related traits. In
conclusion, we demonstrate that psychophysiological
arousal covaries with risk-sensitive decision-making out-
side of a learning context. Our results further highlight the
differential sensitivities of EDA and HR to psychological
features of the decision scenario.
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Decision-making is an important aspect of everyday life
and often involves the assessment of risk. Economic
models predict that, when faced with a risky decision,
humans integrate information about the magnitude of
potential wins and losses, as well as the probability of
those outcomes occurring, in order to select the option with
the highest subjective expected value. Decision-making
under risk has been studied with a wide range of laboratory
gambling tasks in which the participant risks a stake on the
uncertain prospect of receiving a monetary reward (for
reviews, see Brand, Labudda, & Markowitsch, 2006; Platt
& Huettel, 2008; Vorhold, 2008). A common finding from
this research has been that economic models underestimate
the role of emotions in guiding human choice (for reviews,
see Coricelli, Dolan, & Sirigu, 2007;K e n n i n g&P l a s s m a n n ,
2005;L e e ,2006; Platt & Huettel, 2008), and emotional
inputs have been conceptualized within a number of
influential theories (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Damasio, Everitt,
& Bishop, 1996; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001;
Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007).
Emotions comprise both subjective and physiological
(somatic/autonomic) components (see, e.g., Dolan, 2002;
Lang & Davis, 2006), and thus psychophysiological
responses during task performance provide a window into
emotional processing. A range of experimental data show
that physiological signals (e.g., facial expressions, body
movements) modulate choice behavior and judgment
(Barrett & Lindquist, 2008; Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal,
Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). Most
importantly, previous research using the Iowa Gambling
Task has shown that electrodermal activity (EDA) during
choice covaries with decision riskiness (e.g., Bechara,
Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999; Bechara, Damasio,
Tranel, & Damasio 1997; Tchanturia et al., 2007; Tomb,
Hauser, Deldin, & Caramazza, 2002) and that participants
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bad options during card selection achieved better task
performance (Carter & Pasqualini, 2004; Crone, Somsen,
Van Beek, & Van der Molena, 2004; Guillaume et al.,
2009). However, the Iowa Gambling Task assesses
decision-making under ambiguity rather than under explicit
risk, and it is unclear whether psychophysiological signals
reflect the riskiness of choice options even when learning is
not required—that is to say, under explicit risk. In the
present study, we used a novel decision-making task in
which the risks of decision options were presented
explicitly.
In the present study, we investigated the psychophysio-
logical correlates of risk-sensitive decision-making in a
novel gambling task, the Roulette Betting Task. In half of
the trials, participants were asked to actively select the size
of the bet (active-choice trials), and in the other half of the
trials, the bet size was fixed (no-choice trials). Across trials,
the chances of winning and the size of the bet were also
manipulated. To assess psychophysiological arousal, both
EDA and cardiac responses were measured and then
analyzed separately during the selection phase and the
presentation of feedback (i.e., wins and losses). Previous
research on heart rate (HR) responses to emotional stimuli
has identified two distinct markers (for reviews, see
Bradley, 2000; Hodes, Cook, & Lang, 1985): an initial
HR deceleration, interpreted as a sign of attentional
orienting and parasympathetic activity (e.g., Bradley,
2009; Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001; Graham
& Clifton, 1966; Osumi & Ohira, 2009), and a later HR
acceleration, an indicator of emotional arousal and sympa-
thetic activity (Bradley & Lang, 2007; Cook, Hawk, Davis,
& Stevenson, 1991). Previous work has furthermore shown
that HR decelerations are sensitive to response monitoring
(Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2004; Somsen, Van der
Molen, Jennings, & van Beek, 2000) and to violations of
the expectancy of outcomes (Crone et al., 2003). Following
this research, we decomposed the HR time course into
deceleration and acceleration components.
The main goal of this study was to examine how
psychophysiological arousal and risk-taking behavior (i.e.,
the bet size, decision latency) are differentially affected by
(a) the requirement to make an active choice, (b) the choice
uncertainty (the chances of winning), and (c) the bet size
(the magnitude of potential wins/losses).
Requirement for active choice
The role of active choice is highlighted in real gambling
behavior by the phenomenon of “illusory control” (Langer,
1975). In games of pure chance, gamblers will place higher
bets when given the opportunity to make a choice or make
a motor response, relative to situations in which they do not
have such agency (Davis, Sundahl, & Lesbo, 2000;
Henslin, 1967; Ladouceur & Mayrand, 1987;L a n g e r ,
1975). Active choice also influences the processing of
outcomes. Neuroimaging studies have shown that the
activation of the mesolimbic system in response to
monetary rewards is modulated by the requirement for an
active response (O’Doherty et al., 2004; Tricomi, Delgado,
& Fiez, 2004; Walton, Croxson, Behrens, Kennerley, &
Rushworth, 2007; Zink,Pagnoni,Martin-Skurski,Chappelow,
&B e r n s ,2004), and on risky decision-making tasks,
feedback-related brain activity varied according to whether
the win or loss occurred as a result of choice by the
participant or by the computer (Coricelli et al., 2005;R a o ,
Korczykowski, Pluta, Hoang, & Detre, 2008). Ratings of
the pleasantness of wins (Clark, Lawrence, Astley-Jones, &
Gray, 2009) and feedback-related HR responses (Coricelli
et al., 2005; Crone, Bunge, de Klerk, & van der Molen,
2005) are also higher in active-choice conditions. Few
studies have assessed agency effects upon the selection of
options that explicitly vary in riskiness. Rao et al. (2008)
showed that the mesolimbic reward system was differen-
tially activated during the voluntary selection of a risky
option, as compared to involuntary, passive risk-taking. On
the basis of these results, we predicted that psychophysio-
logical reactivity (EDA, HR deceleration, and HR acceler-
ation) during the selection phase (Hypothesis 1A) and the
feedback phase (Hypothesis 1B) would be stronger on trials
in which participants had actively chosen a bet, relative to
fixed-bet trials.
Chances of winning and bet size
Our design allowed the impact of two further decision
parameters to be evaluated: the chances of winning and the
bet size. Economic studies of decision-making behavior
have indicated that both of these factors play roles in the
valuation of risky gambles (Bossaerts & Plott, 2004; Holt &
Laury, 2002), and previous neuroimaging studies confirmed
that during selection of risky options, the probability and
magnitude of potential rewards modulate distinct signals in
the brain (Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan 2001; Huettel, Song,
& McCarthy, 2005; Huettel, Stowe, Gordon, Warner, &
Platt, 2006; Preuschoff, Bossaerts, & Quartz, 2006;
Preuschoff, Quartz, & Bossaerts, 2008; Smith et al., 2009;
Tobler, Christopoulos, O’Doherty, Dolan, & Schultz, 2009;
Xue et al., 2009). The neural substrates implicated (insula,
anterior cingulate cortex) overlap with regions implicated in
the representation of physiological states (Craig, 2009,
2010; Craig, Chen, Bandy, & Reiman, 2000; Critchley,
2005; Critchley, Elliott, Mathias, & Dolan, 2000; Critchley
et al., 2001; Critchley et al., 2003; Gianaros, Van der Veen,
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2009). There is also evidence that choice itself is
differentially affected by the probability and magnitude of
potential rewards. For example, participants put a stronger
emphasis on the probability of outcomes when asked to
judge the attractiveness of gambles, whereas the magnitude
of potential wins has a stronger influence when participants
are asked to price risky financial gambles (Lichtenstein &
Slovic, 1971; Slovic et al., 2007; Slovic & Lichtenstein,
1968). A previous study by Crone et al. (2004) indicated
that different psychophysiological measurements during
selection might signal different aspects of the riskiness of
choices on the Iowa Gambling Task: EDA during card
selection was found to reflect the overall riskiness of the
choice, whereas HR decelerations seem to be sensitive to
the frequency rather than the magnitude of punishment.
Research on the psychophysiological responses to wins and
losses in gambling tasks has furthermore shown that
feedback-related EDA is modulated by the valence
(Bechara et al., 1999; Crone et al., 2004; Dixon, Harrigan,
Sandhu, Collins, & Fugelsang, 2010; Liao et al., 2009;
Starcke, Tuschen-Caffier, Markowitsch, & Brand, 2009;
Tchanturia et al., 2007; Wilkes, Gonsalvez, & Blaszczynski,
2010) and the magnitude (Crone et al., 2004; Wilkes et al.,
2010) of outcomes. In contrast, feedback-related HR
decelerations reflect the frequency of losses (Crone et al.,
2004) and seem to be modulated by valence only in tasks
where the outcomes should be used to adjust future selection
(Crone et al., 2005; Crone et al., 2004; Miu, Heilman, &
Houser, 2008; Somsen et al., 2000; but see also Van der
Veen, Van der Molen, Crone, & Jennings, 2004).
On the basis of these findings, we predicted that the
chances of winning would modulate HR decelerations
during the selection of explicitly risky decisions (Hypoth-
esis 2) and in response to feedback (Hypothesis 3), whereas
the size of bets would influence EDA and HR accelerations
during the selection phase (Hypothesis 4) and the feedback
phase (Hypothesis 5). In addition, we expected that
feedback-related EDA and HR accelerations would reflect
the valence of outcomes (Hypothesis 6).
Individual differences in risk-taking behavior
Other previous research has highlighted important sources
of heterogeneity in risk-taking behavior. In healthy partic-
ipants, high trait impulsivity was associated with deficits in
decision-making and reward-learning performance
(Franken, van Strien, Nijs, & Muris, 2008; Sweitzer, Allen,
& Kaut, 2008). Elevated levels of impulsivity and novelty
seeking have also been observed in clinical conditions
associated with risky decision-making, namely pathological
gambling and drug addiction (for a review, see Verdejo-
García, Lawrence, & Clark, 2008). Functional imaging
studies have indicated a positive correlation between
impulsivity-related traits and neural activity in the ventral
striatum and orbitofrontal cortex, during reward anticipa-
tion (Hahn et al., 2009), and activity in nucleus accumbens
and mesofrontal cortex, in response to reward feedback
(Bjork, Smith, & Hommer, 2008). Thus, individual differ-
ences in decision-making and its neural correlates can be
explained partly by differences in trait personality. No
studies, however, have investigated whether these relation-
ships extend to psychophysiological responses during
decision-making. In the present study, we assessed trait
personality (Barratt Impulsivity Scale, Sensation-Seeking
Scale, and BIS/BAS) and everyday risk-taking preferences
(DOSPERT), and conducted exploratory data analysis to
investigate whether impulsivity-related personality traits
modulate behavioral and psychophysiological responses
during risky decision-making in our sample of healthy
participants.
Method
Participants
A total of 30 right-handed healthy university students took
part in this study (20 females, 10 males; mean age =23 years,
SD = 3.18). Volunteers were told that their reimbursement
for participation depended on their final score in the task and
would range between £5 and £10 (in reality, all participants
received between £9 and £10). The study was approved by
the local ethics committee and was conducted in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants gave
written informed consent.
Procedure
All participants attended a single testing session at the
University of Cambridge. They completed several person-
ality and risk-taking questionnaires: the Barratt Impulsivity
Scale (Version 11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995), the
BIS/BAS (Carver & White, 1994), the Domain-Specific
Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) Scale (Blais & Weber, 2006), and
the Zuckerman Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS) (Zuckerman,
Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978). The Barratt Impulsivity Scale
contains 30 items used to evaluate self-control and forward
planning. The BIS/BAS was developed to assess Gray’s
hypothesized behavioral inhibition system and behavioral
activation systems, which are thought to guide motivational
behavior. The DOSPERT assesses risk-taking (the likeli-
hood of engaging in an activity) and risk-perception (the
judged riskiness of an activity) in five domains (ethical,
financial, health/safety, social, and recreational decisions).
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susceptibility, thrill and adventure seeking, experience
seeking, and disinhibition.
Task
Participants were administered the Roulette Betting Task, a
novel computerized task that assesses risk-sensitive
decision-making. The task was programmed in Visual
Basic 2008 (Microsoft Corp., Redmond, WA, USA) and
administered on a laptop PC with keyboard control.
Participants completed a total of 75 trials on the task,
divided into five blocks of 15 trials each. Each trial
consisted of three phases: selection, anticipation, and
feedback (see Fig. 1). First, a wheel with ten equally sized
red and blue segments was presented, along with three bets.
The ratio of blue (winning) and red (losing) segments
varied across trials, reflecting the chances of winning (60%,
70%, or 80%). The presentation of the wheel initiated the
selection phase: Participants were asked to choose one of
the three presented bet boxes by pressing a corresponding
key on a keyboard. Two trial types were contrasted: active-
choice trials, in which the participants were required to
select a bet (10, 50, or 90 points), and no-choice trials
(matched for monetary gain), in which all three bets boxes
contained identical amounts. Once a bet had been selected,
the wheel was spun for an anticipation period. A relatively
long anticipation period, varying between 4 and 6 s, was
used in order to obtain temporal segregation of selection-
and feedback-related psychophysiological responses. The
wheel stopped on one of the ten segments, initiating the
feedback period. If the wheel stopped on a blue segment,
the chosen amount of points was won, and the outcome
message “YOU WON [XX] POINTS” was presented. If the
wheel stopped on red, the selected amount of points was
lost, and the message “YOU LOST [XX] POINTS”
appeared. At the end of each trial, a fixation cross was
displayed for a variable intertrial interval (between 8 and
12 s). In order to minimize the influence of accumulated
score upon betting on a trial-by-trial basis, the current point
score was only presented to participants at the end of each
block.
Data acquisition
A Biopac system (MP150, recording at 1,000 samples per
second; Biopac Systems, Goleta, CA, USA) with two
amplifiers (ECG100C module and GSR100C module) was
used to measure EDA and the electrocardiogram (ECG)
throughout the task. Electrodes were attached prior to
beginning the task, and at least 2 min of resting-state
activity were recorded in order to allow participants to
adapt to the recording equipment, and to allow EDA levels
to stabilize (see Fowles et al., 1981). EDA was measured
using two grounded Ag–AgCl electrodes attached to the
distal phalange of the index and middle fingers of the
nondominant hand. Isotonic paste (BIOPAC Gel 101) was
used as the electrolyte. A low-pass filter of 1.0 Hz and a
DC high-pass filter were applied to the EDA recording. HR
was recorded using disposable Ag–AgCl ECG electrodes
(Vermed EL503 patches) secured to the right dorsal forearm
and left ankle. The ECG recording was high-pass filtered at
0.05 Hz. AcqKnowledge Software (Version 3.9.0; Biopac
Systems) was used to record and event-mark the psycho-
physiological data. The EDA signal was transformed into
units of microsiemens, and for the cardiac data, interbeat
intervals were obtained from deviations between the ECG
R-waves and were transformed online into beats per minute
(bpm)—that is, HR.
Data analysis
Behavioral responses were assessed using the following
measurements: (a) decision latency, or the time between
wheel onset and the selection of a bet option; (b) average
bet amount, in active-choice trials; and (c) risk adjustment
in active-choice trials, or the degree to which participants
adjusted their bets to the varying chances of winning,
formalized as the average change in bet size (in 60%- and
70%-trials) as a percentage of the bet on 80%-trials.
Fig. 1 Task design. Each trial
consisted of three phases: (1)
selection, in which the partici-
pant chose one of the bet
options (here, an active-choice
trial is depicted); (2) anticipa-
tion, in which the wheel was
spun; and (3) feedback. The
variable intertrial interval is not
shown on this graph
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for the selection phase and the feedback phase. Changes
from baseline scores were calculated, using a 1-s baseline
interval immediately preceding either the selection or the
feedback phase. Given that EDA responses are uniphasic,
typically peaking between 2 and 6 s poststimulus (Dawson,
Schell, & Filion, 2007), we calculated feedback-related
EDA as the maximum value during the interval 2–6 s after
the onset of feedback minus the feedback baseline. For
selection-related EDA, we allowed a slightly longer time
window of 2–7 s after trial onset (minus baseline), given
that choice-related arousal is unlikely to occur in immediate
response to the trial onset. Unlike EDA, the cardiac
response to motivational stimuli is typically biphasic (for
reviews, see Bradley, 2000, 2009; Bradley & Lang, 2007;
Graham & Clifton, 1966; Hodes et al., 1985), and we
therefore extracted the initial HR deceleration component
and the subsequent HR acceleration component separately
(cf. Bradley et al., 2001; Osumi & Ohira, 2009). The
selection-related HR deceleration peak was defined as the
minimum HR value 0–3 s after onset of the wheel minus
the selection baseline, and the selection-related HR accel-
eration peak was defined as the maximum value 2–6 s after
the onset of the wheel minus the selection baseline (see
Fig. 2). Feedback-related summary measures were calcu-
lated in the same manner.
Of the participants, 6 were excluded from the EDA
analysis due to technical problems, and 2 were excluded
from the HR analyses: 1 was excluded due to a technical
problem during data acquisition, and the other was
excluded due to extreme values (more than 2 SDs from
sample mean).
Statistical analysis of the psychophysiological and
behavioral data was conducted in SPSS (Version 15.0;
SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). The effects of choice
uncertainty and bet size were investigated in separate
analyses. To assess the impact of choice uncertainty, a
repeated measures ANOVA with the Chances of Winning
(60%, 70%, or 80%) and Choice Condition (active-choice
vs. no-choice) as factors was conducted on decision times
and the selection-related psychophysiological measure-
ments (EDA, HR deceleration, and HR acceleration). The
effects of bet size were assessed using repeated measures
ANOVA with Choice Condition (active-choice vs. no-
choice) and Bet Size as factors. In active-choice trials, a
number of participants did not select all available options
throughout the task. For the investigation of bet size effects,
we therefore collapsed the 10- and 50-point bets together in
comparison against the high bets (90 points). To prevent
any effects of heteroscedasticity, Greenhouse–Geisser cor-
rections were applied to ANOVAs when sphericity could
not be assumed (Mauchly’s sphericity test <.05). Follow-up
comparisons were then conducted. All statistical tests are
reported two-tailed, and alpha was set at .05.
An exploratory analysis was conducted to investigate
links between individual differences in trait personality and
behavioral and psychophysiological responses. Nonpara-
metric correlations were conducted, and 95% confidence
intervals (CIs) were calculated as an effect size estimator
for the correlation coefficients. The following personality
measurements were used for this analysis: impulsivity
(Barratt total score), behavioral inhibition (BIS total),
behavioral activation (BAS total), sensation seeking (SSS
total), financial risk-taking (DOSPERT), and financial risk-
perception (DOSPERT). Three psychophysiological meas-
urements were calculated: (1) the difference between
selection-related arousal on active-choice versus no-choice
trials; (2) the difference between selection-related arousal to
active choice of a high bet versus active choice of a low
bet; and (3) the difference between feedback-related arousal
to wins versus losses. In separate analyses, we then
calculated the correlations between the personality scores
and (a) behavioral responses (average bet and average risk-
adjustment on choice trials), (b) selection-related EDA
measurements, (c) selection-related HR measurements, (d)
feedback-related EDA measurements, and (e) feedback-
related HR measurements.
Results
Behavioral responses were sensitive to both the chances of
winning and the requirement for active choice: A 3
Fig. 2 The cardiovascular time course at selection onset. Selection-
related change in heart rate (HR, in beats per minute) was averaged
across 0.5-s bins, for all trials and all participants, to illustrate the
prototypical biphasic function. We extracted the HR deceleration (0–
3 s after wheel presentation) and the HR acceleration (2–6 s) using the
peak values (i.e., deceleration minimum and acceleration maximum
values, rather than mean values) within those epochs. Thus, the peak
scores used in the analysis were stronger than the responses depicted
here
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measures ANOVA on the decision latencies revealed a
significant Chances of Winning x Choice Condition
interaction [F(2, 58) = 9.427, p <. 0 0 1 ,h2
p ¼ :25], as well
as significant main effects of chances of winning [F(2, 58) =
53.80, p <. 0 0 1 ,h2
p ¼ :65] and choice condition [F(1, 29) =
47.21, p <. 0 0 1 ,h2
p ¼ :62]. Participants were faster to select
their bet on no-choice than on active-choice trials (p <. 0 0 1 ) .
On both active-choice and no-choice trials, participants
were faster to select a bet on the 80% trials than on the
70% trials, and faster on the 70% trials than on the 60%
trials (ps < .001). The significant interaction was explained
by the differences in decision latencies between 60%,
70%, and 80% trials (i.e., the slopes of the lines of best
fit) being higher on active-choice trials than on no-choice
trials (p <. 0 0 1 )( s e eF i g .3a).
In addition, participants adjusted their bets to the
winning chances on active-choice trials: A significant main
effect of chances of winning was found [F(1.5, 43.1) =
67.96, p < .001, h2
p ¼ :70], with higher bets chosen on the
80% than on the 70% trials, and higher bets likewise on the
70% than on the 60% trials (ps < .001) (see Fig. 3b).
Effects of active choice and chances of winning
Selection-related psychophysiological responses
The requirement for active choice modulated selection-
related EDA. A 3 (chances of winning) x 2 (choice
condition) ANOVA (n = 24) revealed a significant main
effect of choice condition [F(1, 23) = 4.70, p < .05,
h2
p ¼ :17], with stronger selection-related EDA on active-
choice than on no-choice trials. There was no significant
main effect of chances of winning [F(2, 46) = 1.56], nor
any Chances of Winning x Choice Condition interaction
[F(1.6, 46) = 0.95].
Selection-related HR decelerations were also affected by
the requirement of active choice, and additionally were
sensitive to the chances of winning. A 3 (chances of
winning) x 2 (choice condition) ANOVA (n = 28) revealed
a significant main effect of chances of winning [F(2, 54) =
4.32, p < .05, h2
p ¼ :14] and a marginally significant effect
of choice condition [F(1, 27) = 3.41, p = .08, h2
p ¼ :11], but
no significant Chances of Winning x Choice Condition
interaction [F(2, 54) = 0.63]. Post-hoc analyses showed a
significant main effect of chances of winning on active-
choice trials [F(2, 54) = 3.99, p < .05, h2
p ¼ :13], with
stronger HR decelerations on 60% trials than on either
70% or 80% trials (ps < .01), but no effect on no-choice
trials [F(2, 54) = 1.66] (see Fig. 4).
HR accelerations during selection, on the other hand,
were not systematically affected by either the requirement
for active choice or the chances of winning. A 3 (chances of
winning) x 2 (choice condition) ANOVA found no
significant main effects [chances of winning, F(2, 54) =
2.50; choice condition, F(1, 27) = 1.78] nor a significant
Chances of Winning x Choice Condition interaction [F(2,
54) = 1.55].
Feedback-related psychophysiological responses
The requirement for active choice modulated feedback-
related EDA. A 3 (chances of winning) x 2 (choice
condition) x 2 (outcome) ANOVA (n = 24) showed a
significant main effect of choice condition [F(1, 23) = 5.95,
p <. 0 5 ,h2
p ¼ :21], but all further main effects and
interactions were nonsignificant [outcome, F(1, 23) =
1.67; chances of winning, F(2, 46) = 1.77; Choice
Condition x Outcome, F(1, 23) = 2.83; Choice Condition x
Chances of Winning, F(1.4, 31.2) = 1.31; Outcome x
Chances of Winning, F(2, 46) = 1.50; Choice Condition x
Outcome x Chances of Winning, F(1.4, 32.6) = 1.22].
HR deceleration during feedback was affected by active
choice and by the chances of winning. A 3 (chances of
winning) x 2 (choice condition) x 2 (outcome) ANOVA
(n = 28) found a significant main effect of choice
condition [F(1, 27) = 5.03, p < .05, h2
p ¼ :16], with
stronger HR decelerations on no-choice than on active-
choice trials (p < .05), and a significant Choice Condition
x Chances of Winning interaction [F(2, 54) = 3.81, p <
.05, h2
p ¼ :13]. Post-hoc comparisons showed that HR
Fig. 3 Behavioral results. a
Decision latencies decreased
with increasing chances of win-
ning and were higher for active-
choice than for no-choice trials.
b For active-choice trials, the
average bet that participants
chose increased with increasing
chances of winning. Error Bars
represent standard errors of the
means
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choice trials when the chances of winning were 60% or 80%
(ps < .01; see Fig. 5). No further significant main effects or
interactions were observed [ratio, F(2, 54) = 0.42; Choice
Condition x Outcome, F(1, 23) = 0.26; Chances of
Winning x Outcome, F(2, 54) = 0.77; Choice Condition x
Chances of Winning x Outcome, F(2, 54) = 3.19].
Feedback-related HR accelerations also showed sensi-
tivity to the choice condition, but not to the chances of
winning. In a 3 (chances of winning) x 2 (choice condition)
x 2 (outcome) ANOVA (n = 28), significant main effects of
choice condition [F(1, 27) = 15.19, p < .001, h2
p ¼ :36] and
outcome [F(1, 27) = 11.947, p < .01, ηp
2 = .31], and a
significant Choice Condition x Chances of Winning
interaction [F(2, 54) = 9.361, p < .001, h2
p ¼ :26] were
observed, with stronger HR accelerations to feedback in
active-choice trials than to feedback in no-choice trials
(p < .01) and to wins than to losses in no-choice trials
(p < .001; see Fig. 6). No further significant main effects or
interactions were found [chances of winning, F(2, 54) =
0.31; Choice Condition x Outcome, F(1, 27) = 0.01;
Outcome x Chances of Winning, F(2, 54) = 0.54;
Choice Condition x Outcome x Chances of Winning,
F(2, 54) = 0.84].
Thus, in accordance with Hypothesis 1A, selection-
related EDA and HR decelerations were influenced by the
requirement for active choice. Contrary to our expectations,
however, selection-related HR accelerations were not
affected by the choice condition. Similarly, our results
confirm Hypothesis 1B: Feedback-related psychophysio-
logical responses (EDA, HR deceleration, and HR acceler-
ation) to the presentation of outcomes were affected by
whether or not a participant had made an active choice. Our
results were also in line with Hypotheses 2 and 3: The
chances of winning did modulate HR decelerations during
the selection of explicitly presented risky options and
during the feedback period.
Effects of bet size
Selection-related psychophysiological responses
The size of the bet modulated EDA during selection. A 2
(bet) x 2 (choice condition) repeated measures ANOVA (n
= 22, given that some participants selected exclusively from
the highest bet) revealed a marginally significant main
effect of bet [F(1, 21) = 3.82, p = .06, h2
p ¼ :15], with
greater EDA during selection of the higher bets. There was
no significant effect of choice condition in this analysis [F
(1, 21) = 2.82], nor a significant Choice Condition x Bet
interaction [F(1, 21) = 1.30; see Fig. 7].
HR decelerations during selection were not sensitive to
the size of bets. In contrast, a 3 (bet) x 2 (choice condition)
ANOVA (n = 25) found no significant main effects and no
Fig. 5 Feedback-related heart rate (HR) decelerations. HR deceler-
ations differed between active-choice and no-choice trials when the
chances of winning were 60% or 80%. Error bars represent standard
errors of the means
Fig. 4 Selection-related heart rate (HR) decelerations. HR deceler-
ations in active-choice trails were modulated by the chances of
winning. In no-choice trials, the HR decelerations did not significantly
differ between the different chances of winning. Error bars represent
standard errors of the means
Fig. 6 Feedback-related heart rate (HR) accelerations. Win- and loss-
related HR accelerations were stronger on active-choice than on no-
choice trials. Error bars represent standard errors of the means
150 Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2011) 11:144–158significant interaction [choice condition, F(1, 24) = 0.46; bet,
F(1, 24) = 0.16; Choice Condition x Bet, F(1, 24) = 0.47].
Equally, selection-related HR accelerations were not
affected by the size of bets. A 3 (bet) x 2 (choice condition)
ANOVA revealed no significant main effects [bet, F(1, 24) =
0.19; choice condition, F(1, 24) = 0.86] and no significant
Choice Condition x Bet interaction [F(1, 24) = 3.04].
Feedback-related psychophysiological responses
As well as showing sensitivity to active choice, feedback-
related EDA was also modulated by bet size, and these
effects depended on outcome valences. A 2 (choice
condition) x 2 (outcome) x 2 (bet) ANOVA (n = 20)
revealed significant main effects of choice condition [F(1,
19) = 7.26, p < .05, h2
p ¼ :28] and bet [F(1, 19) = 4.62, p <
.05, h2
p ¼ :20], along with a significant Choice Condition x
Outcome interaction [F(1, 19) = 4.61, p < .05, h2
p ¼ :20], as
well as a Bet x Outcome interaction that approached
statistical significance [F(1, 19) = 3.37, p =. 0 8 ,
h2
p ¼ :15]. EDA responses to low and high losses were
stronger in active-choice trials than in no-choice trials
(ps < .05). On active-choice trials, EDA was stronger in
response to high than to low losses (p < .05; see Fig. 8b).
On win trials, however, no significant differences were
observed between active-choice and no-choice trials, or
between high wins and low wins (ps>. 0 5 ;s e eF i g .8a). In
active-choice trials, loss-related EDA was marginally
higher than win-related EDA (p = .07), but no differences
were found between win-related and loss-related EDA in
no-choice trials (p =. 6 5 ) .
Bet size did not modulate the feedback-related HR
deceleration. A 2 (bet) x 2 (choice condition) x 2 (outcome)
ANOVA (n = 23) revealed only a marginally significant
effect of choice condition [F(1, 22) = 4.02, p = .06,
h2
p ¼ :15]. All further main effects and interactions were
nonsignificant [outcome, F(1, 22) = 1.51; bet, F(1, 22) =
1.16; Choice Condition x Outcome, F(1, 22) = 0.61; Choice
Condition x Bet, F(1, 22) = 0.19; Outcome x Bet, F(1, 22) =
0.34; Choice Condition x Outcome x Bet, F(1, 22) = 0.17].
Feedback-related HR accelerations also did not vary
with the size of bets. A 2 (choice condition) x 2 (outcome)
x 2 (bet) ANOVA (n = 23) confirmed significant main
effects of choice condition [F(1, 22) = 12.17, p < .01,
h2
p ¼ :36] and outcome [F(1, 22) = 11.52, p < .01,
h2
p ¼ :34] but showed no significant main effect of bet [F
(1, 22) = 0.22] and no significant interactions [Choice
Condition x Outcome, F(1, 22) = 0.01; Choice Condition x
Bet, F(1, 22) = 0.13; Outcome x Bet, F(1, 22) = 0.38;
Choice Condition x Outcome x Bet, F(1, 22) = 0.01].
In conclusion, our findings partially confirm Hypotheses
4 and 5: EDA was sensitive to the size of bets during the
selection as well as during the feedback period. Contrary to
our expectations, however, selection- and feedback-related
HR accelerations were not affected by the bet size. Our
results also confirmed Hypothesis 6: Feedback-related EDA
and HR accelerations were modulated by the valence of
outcomes.
Correlations with trait personality
Exploratory analysis of the questionnaire data revealed
several trait predictors of behavioral responses on the task.
Fig. 7 Selection-related electrodermal activity (EDA) peaks. EDA
was higher during the selection of high bets than during selection of
low bets. Low bet 10 or 50 points, high bet 90 points. Error bars
represent standard errors of the means
Fig. 8 Feedback-related electrodermal activity (EDA) peaks. Al-
though EDA in response to wins was not significantly affected by the
choice condition or by the size of bets (a), loss-related EDA was
higher in active-choice than in no-choice trials and was stronger for
high losses than for low losses in active-choice trials (b). Low bet 10
or 50 points, High bet 90 points. Error bars represent standard errors
of the means
151 Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2011) 11:144–158The average bet on active-choice trials was correlated
positively with financial risk-taking on the DOSPERT
(Spearman’s rho = .39, CI = .03 to .66) and negatively
with financial risk-perception (Spearman’sr h o=−.50,
CI = −.73 to –.17). Risk adjustment was positively corre-
lated with inhibition (BIS/BAS; Spearman’s rho = .38,
CI = .02 to .65) and with financial risk-perception (DOS-
PERT; Spearman’s rho = .49, CI = .16 to .72; see Table 1).
On selection-related EDA, the increase on active-
choice trials relative to no-choice trials was correlated
positively with sensation seeking (SSS; Spearman’sr h o=
.46, CI = .07 to .73) and with behavioral activation
(BAS; Spearman’sr h o=. 6 2 ,C I=. 2 8t o. 8 2 ) .T h e
increase in selection-related EDA on high versus low
bets was also correlated positively with sensation seeking
(Spearman’s rho = .49, CI = .09 to .76; see Table 2).
Thus, participants with higher levels of sensation seeking
and behavioral activation showed greater EDA during
active choice and during choice of high bets.
With HR, there were no trait correlations against
selection-related activity. On feedback-related HR, the
difference in HR accelerations to wins versus losses was
correlated positively with Barratt impulsivity (Spearman’s
rho = .38, CI = .01 to .66). No correlations between
feedback-related EDA and personality were observed.
Discussion
In this study, we examined psychophysiological arousal
during healthy participants’ performance of a novel
gambling task that assesses decision-making under explicit
risk, rather than decision-making in a learning context (i.e.,
under ambiguity), which has widely been explored in
previous studies using the Iowa Gambling Task. We
assessed how betting behavior and psychophysiological
arousal were affected by (a) the requirement to make an
active choice, (b) the magnitude of potential wins/losses,
and (c) the chances of winning. Behavioral results showed
sensitivity to the choice requirement and to the chances of
winning. Measurements of psychophysiological arousal
were sensitive to all three factors (summarized in Table 3):
First, psychophysiological responses during selection and
feedback were more pronounced on trials in which an
active choice of bet was required, as compared to the fixed-
bet trials. Second, selection-related EDA and loss-related
EDA responses were potentiated on trials in which a larger
bet was staked. Third, HR deceleration during selection was
sensitive to the chances of winning, with stronger responses
at the greatest level of choice uncertainty.
Requirement for active choice
Our results highlight the profound importance of active
choice: Psychophysiological arousal during the selection of
a risky option and during feedback was intensified by the
requirement for active choice. These results are in accor-
dance with previous research showing that the emotional
and cognitive responses in reward tasks are influenced by
choice and motor response requirements. Two previous
imaging studies (Coricelli et al., 2005; Rao et al., 2008)
Table 1 Personality and behavioral responses
Financial Risk-
Perception
Financial
Risk-Taking
Sensation
Seeking
BAS BIS Barratt Risk
Adjustment
Average Bet rs –.50 .39 .00 –.15 –.34 .21 –.77
CI –.73 to –.17 .03 to .66 –.36 to .36 –.48 to .22 –.63 to .03 .18 to .54 –.89 to –.57
Risk rs .49 –.34 .11 –.05 .38 –.07
Adjustment CI .16 to .72 –.63 to .02 –.26 to .45 –.41 to .32 .02 to .65 –.43 to .31
Barratt rs –.23 .35 .63 .13 –.07
CI –.56 to .16 –.03 to .64 .34 to .81 –.26 to .52 –.43 to .31
Behavioral
Inhibition (BIS)
rs .19 –.00 .08 –.07
CI –.19 to .52 –.36 to .36 –.29 to .43 –.43 to .31
Behavioral
Activation (BAS)
rs .00 –.21 .37
CI –.36 to .36 –.53 to .17 .00 to .65
Sensation Seeking rs –.06 .20
CI –.41 to .31 –.18 to .52
Financial rs –.45
Risk-Taking CI .11 to .70
rs Spearman’s rho, CI 95% confidence interval. CIs that do not cross zero are indicated in bold type
152 Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2011) 11:144–158showed that neural activation in the reward system during
selection and in response to feedback was modulated by the
choice condition (active and voluntary vs. passive and
computer-controlled). We observed that feedback-related
EDA differed between wins and losses only in active-
choice trials. Consistent with the imaging results of Rao et
al., (2008) we furthermore showed that active choice did
not affect win-related EDA but enhanced loss-related EDA.
Although our results clearly highlight the strong impact of
active choice upon psychophysiological arousal during
decision-making, certain effects nonetheless also carried
over into the no-choice condition. On no-choice trials,
reaction times were affected by the chances of winning, and
feedback-related HR acceleration differed between wins
and losses.
Bet size
EDA during the selection of a risky option, and in response
to losses, increased with the bet size. This result extends
previous work with the Iowa Gambling Task, which has
shown that increased psychophysiological arousal can serve
as a somatic signal and can promote (Bechara, Damasio, &
Damasio, 2000; Damasio, Bechara, & Damasio, 2002;
Tomb et al., 2002) or inhibit (Crone et al., 2004; Damasio,
1994) risky choice, depending on the context. In our task,
the expected values were uniformly positive, and the
optimal strategy was therefore to bet high. Importantly, in
contrast to the Iowa Gambling Task, the magnitude of
potential wins and losses was explicitly present in our task,
and therefore no learning of the reward contingencies was
Table 2 Personality and selection-related EDA response
Financial Risk-
Perception
Financial
Risk-Taking
Sensation
Seeking
BAS BIS Barratt EDA High
Bet – Low Bet
EDA Active
Choice – No Choice
rs .11 –.09 .46 .62 –.18 .22 .65
CI –.31 to .49 –.48 to .32 .07 to .73 .28 to .82 –.55 to .26 –.22 to .59 .31 to .76
EDA High
Bet – Low Bet
rs .08 –.19 .49 .39 –.16 .38
CI –.35 to .53 –.57 to .25 .09 to .76 –.05 to .70 –.55 to .29 –.07 to .70
Barratt rs –.31 .37 .68 .32 –.09
CI –.65 to .13 –.06 to 67 .36 to .86 –.65 to .12 –.49 to .35
Behavioral
Inhibition (BIS)
rs .32 .02 –.07 –.27
CI –.11 to .65 –.39 to .43 –.47 to .35 –.61 to .16
Behavioral
Activation (BAS)
rs –.09 –.11 .39
CI –.46 to .35 –.49 to .31 –.03 to .69
Sensation Seeking rs –.04 .21
CI . –.44 to .36 –.22 to 57
Financial
Risk-Taking
rs –.36
CI –.66 to .05
rs Spearman’s rho, CI 95% confidence interval. CIs that do not cross zero are indicated in bold type
EDA HR Deceleration HR Acceleration
Selection-Related Psychophysiological Responses
Active choice ✓✓ ✘
Chances of winning ✘✓ ✘
Bet size ✓✘ ✘
Win-Related Psychophysiological Responses
Active choice ✘✓ ✓
Chances of winning ✘✓ ✘
Bet size ✘✘ ✘
Loss-Related Psychophysiological Responses
Active choice ✓✓ ✓
Chances of winning ✘✓ ✘
Bet size ✓✘ ✘
Table 3 Sensitivity
of selection- and feedback-
related physiological measure-
ments for active-choice require-
ment, chances of winning, and
bet size
153 Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2011) 11:144–158needed. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
demonstration that psychophysiological arousal during
decision-making covaries with the bet amount in a non-
learning environment. Our results are also consistent with
economic studies showing that the magnitude of potential
wins/losses influences the valuation of risky gambles
(Bossaerts & Plott, 2004; Holt & Laury, 2002; Lichtenstein
& Slovic, 1971; Slovic et al., 2007; Slovic & Lichtenstein,
1968), and they extend this finding to EDA sensitivity.
Chances of winning
In addition to the bet size, psychophysiological responses
were also sensitive to the chances of winning: Selection-
and feedback-related HR decelerations were modulated by
the chances of winning—that is to say, by choice
uncertainty. Previous research (e.g., Bradley, 2000; Crone
et al., 2004; Hodes et al., 1985; Somsen, Van der Molen, &
Orlebeke, 1983) has suggested that HR deceleration reflects
the extent to which attention is allocated to potentially
aversive stimuli, is stronger in situations in which the
frequency of potential punishment is high, and reacts to
expectancy violations. Interestingly, in our study EDA and
HR showed differential sensitivities to the three aspects of
the decision that we manipulated in our task. The
observation that different physiological responses can react
differently to the same arousing situation can be traced back
to Lacey (1967; see also defense cascade: Lang, 1995;
Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997) and can be explained by
distinct associations with the parasympathetic and sympa-
thetic systems. HR decelerations reflect parasympathetic
activity, are sensitive to valence, and serve to increase
attention and orienting. HR acceleration and EDA, on the
other hand, are controlled by the sympathetic system and
reflect the intensity of emotions, rather than their valence
(see Bradley & Lang, 2007, for a review). Our results fit
into this wider framework by showing that during decision-
making, HR decelerations are more pronounced in situa-
tions with higher choice uncertainty, whereas EDA and HR
accelerations are enhanced by the requirement to make an
active choice and by higher bet amounts—factors that are
thought to intensify emotional arousal during decision-
making. In addition, our results compare to the findings of
neuroimaging studies of decision-making, which have
shown that in the brain, the probability and the magnitude
of potential rewards are also encoded by two distinct neural
signals (Critchley et al., 2001; Huettel et al., 2005; Huettel
et al., 2006; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Preuschoff et al., 2008;
Smith et al., 2009; Tobler et al., 2009; Xue et al., 2009).
Importantly, several of the brain regions known to encode
the riskiness of decisions are also involved in the cortical
control and mapping of electrodermal activity and cardiac
responses, notably the anterior cingulate cortex, the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and the insula (Craig,
2009, 2010; Craig et al., 2000; Critchley, 2005; Critchley
et al., 2000, 2001, 2003; Gianaros et al., 2004; Ohira et al.,
2010; Thayer & Lane, 2009).
Individual differences
A further goal of this study was to investigate whether
personality traits are linked to a person’s betting behavior
and psychophysiological reactivity during decision-making.
Three main results were obtained in an exploratory
analysis. First, betting behavior was correlated with self-
reported financial risk-taking attitudes and with differences
in trait behavioral inhibition. Second, individual differences
in sensation seeking and behavioral activation were
correlated with selection-related EDA. Participants with
higher scores on the SSS and BIS/BAS scales showed
stronger reactivity related to active choice and high bet size
during selection. Third, we observed a positive correlation
between impulsivity and the differential responses to wins
as compared to losses. We believe that ours is the first study
to link these impulsivity-related traits with psychophysio-
logical indices during decision-making. Our results com-
plement previous studies that have linked individual
differences in impulsive traits with laboratory risk-taking
behavior (Franken et al., 2008; Sweitzer et al., 2008), with
neural activity during reward anticipation (Hahn et al.,
2009), with neural activation of the reward system in
response to monetary outcomes (Bjork et al., 2008), and with
midbrain dopamine autoreceptor availability (Buckholtz et
al., 2010). Our findings demonstrate that differences in
impulsive traits constitute important sources of heteroge-
neity in risk-taking behavior, for consideration in future
research. In addition, this constellation of traits have
been identified as risk factors for forms of addiction,
including drug abuse and problem gambling. Pathologi-
cal gamblers tend to score higher than healthy controls
on novelty seeking and impulsivity (Forbush et al., 2008;
Kim & Grant, 2001; Lawrence, Luty, Bogdan, Sahakian,
&C l a r k ,2009; Nordin & Nylander, 2007; Verdejo-García
et al., 2008), and these traits in adolescence prospectively
predict later drug use and gambling problems (Slutske,
Caspi, Moffitt, & Poulton, 2005; Vitaro, Arseneault, &
Tremblay, 1999). In light of the key role that psychophys-
iological arousal is likely to play in the maintenance of
gambling behavior (see Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs,
& Van den Brink, 2004, for a review), it could be speculated
from our data that individuals with higher levels of trait
novelty seeking and behavioral activation might experience
stronger risk-induced psychophysiological arousal and might
be at increased risk of developing disordered gambling. At
154 Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2011) 11:144–158the same time, given that HR and EDA were sensitive to
different aspects of risky decisions, our results caution
against a simple treatment of psychophysiological arousal
during gambling as a unitary construct.
There are limitations to the present study. Primarily, we
monitored psychophysiological activity in a correlational
design, and though we were able to associate certain
aspects of decision-making with bodily signals, we could
not ascertain the causal significance of these signals in the
decision-making process (see Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence
2006; Moors, 2009). Further work will be required in order
to look at the effects of autonomic manipulations (e.g.,
epinephrine injection) or autonomic pathologies on subtle
aspects of decision-making performance. The second caveat
pertains to our task design. On active-choice trials,
participants were free to select their bets, and a minority
of participants did not distribute their bets over the
available range. We were thus forced to collapse across
the low and medium bets, therefore comparing only two
levels of bet size. In addition, our analyses of bet size and
chances of winning included slightly differing numbers of
participants. Third, the gambles in our design had a positive
expected value, such that the chances of winning were
uniformly higher than the chances of losing, and wins were
more frequent outcomes than losses. It is conceivable that
both the selection- and feedback-related responses could
differ in a decision environment with a negative expected
value and a higher frequency of losses. Future research
should investigate the distinct influence of positive versus
negative expected values upon psychophysiological arousal
during explicit risky decision-making.
In conclusion, the results of this study underline the role
of emotional processes in risk-sensitive decision-making.
Psychophysiological measurements during selection of a
risky option and in response to wins and losses are
intensified by active choice and modulated by the explicit
risk associated with decisions (the chances of winning and
the bet size). Additionally, our results show that different
psychophysiological markers (HR decelerations and EDA)
signal different aspects of the riskiness of a decision.
Finally, this research has revealed that differences in
personality traits, including behavioral activation and
sensation seeking, as well as everyday risk-taking propen-
sities (assessed using the DOSPERT), help explain individ-
ual differences in physiological arousal during risky
decision-making and in actual betting behavior.
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